Strategic voting when participation is costly

Dimitrios Xefteris

Games and Economic Behavior, 2019, vol. 116, issue C, 122-127

Abstract: We study a general multiparty model of plurality rule elections with costly participation, and prove that strategic voting – that is, situations in which some voters abandon their most preferred alternative and vote strategically for the serious contender they dislike less – may emerge in equilibrium; just like when participation is costless/compulsory (Palfrey, 1989). This qualifies opposite claims made in more confined setups (e.g. Arzumanyan and Polborn, 2017), and establishes that Duverger's psychological effect is present in a much larger set of cases than currently believed.

Keywords: Multiparty elections; Plurality rule; Costly voting; Duverger's law; Strategic voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Working Paper: Strategic Voting when Participation is Costly (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:116:y:2019:i:c:p:122-127

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.04.010

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