Zero-sum games with ambiguity

Dinah Rosenberg and Nicolas Vieille

Games and Economic Behavior, 2019, vol. 117, issue C, 238-249

Abstract: We study whether the basic tenets of the theory of zero-sum games are still valid when players are uncertainty averse. We focus on games with one-sided information, in which the uninformed player is uncertain about the state of nature. Uncertainty aversion turns the underlying zero-sum game into a many-player, non-zero-sum game. We show that the uninformed player has a unique equilibrium payoff. We provide conditions under which there is a unique equilibrium payoff vector.

Keywords: Uncertainty aversion; Ambiguity; Zero-sum games; Incomplete information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:117:y:2019:i:c:p:238-249

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.04.013

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