Limiting Sender's information in Bayesian persuasion

Shota Ichihashi

Games and Economic Behavior, 2019, vol. 117, issue C, 276-288

Abstract: I study how the outcome of Bayesian persuasion depends on Sender's information. I consider a game in which, prior to Sender's information disclosure, Designer can restrict the most informative signal that Sender can generate. In the binary action case, I consider arbitrary preferences of Designer and characterize all equilibrium outcomes. As a corollary, I derive an information restriction that maximizes Receiver's payoffs: Whenever Designer can increase Receiver's payoffs by restricting Sender's information, the Receiver-optimal way coincides with an equilibrium of a hypothetical game in which Receiver persuades Sender.

Keywords: Information disclosure; Bayesian persuasion; Information design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Limiting Sender’s Information in Bayesian Persuasion (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:117:y:2019:i:c:p:276-288

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.07.006

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