Evolutionary selection against iteratively weakly dominated strategies

Axel Bernergård and Erik Mohlin ()

Games and Economic Behavior, 2019, vol. 117, issue C, 82-97

Abstract: This paper provides sufficient conditions under which regular payoff monotonic evolutionary dynamics (a class of imitative dynamics that includes the replicator dynamic) select against strategies that do not survive a sequence of iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies. We apply these conditions to Bertrand duopolies and first-price auctions. Our conditions also imply evolutionary selection against iteratively strictly dominated strategies.

Keywords: Iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies; Iterated admissibility; Payoff monotonicity; Convex monotonicity; Evolutionary dynamics; Replicator dynamic (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Evolutionary Selection against Iteratively Weakly Dominated Strategies (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:117:y:2019:i:c:p:82-97

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.05.009

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