Reacting to ambiguous messages: An experimental analysis

Christian Kellner, Mark T. Le Quement and Gerhard Riener

Games and Economic Behavior, 2022, vol. 136, issue C, 360-378

Abstract: Ambiguous language is ubiquitous and often deliberate. Recent theoretical work (Bose and Renou, 2014; Kellner and Le Quement, 2018; Beauchêne et al., 2019) has shown how language ambiguation can improve outcomes by mitigating conflict of interest. Our experiment finds a significant effect of language ambiguation on subjects who are proficient at Bayesian updating. For ambiguity averse subjects within this population, a significant part of this effect operates via the channel of subjects' desire to reduce ambiguity. For both ambiguity averse and neutral subjects within this population, an additional behavioral channel is also present.

Keywords: Ambiguity aversion; Communication; Persuasion; Laboratory experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D01 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:136:y:2022:i:c:p:360-378

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.09.007

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