The value of uncertainty in determining an expert's source of expertise

Francisco Silva

Games and Economic Behavior, 2022, vol. 136, issue C, 379-388

Abstract: Experts who rely heavily on their network of clients to provide good advice tend to suggest instead that their expertise is due to their technical knowledge. I show how doubt over the experts' source of expertise might not only help these experts but also their clients. Furthermore, I show how it is possible for them to sustain such doubt indefinitely even when their clients have rational expectations.

Keywords: Imperfect monitoring; Dynamic cheap talk; Experts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:136:y:2022:i:c:p:379-388

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.09.010

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