Statistical inference in evolutionary dynamics

Ryoji Sawa and Jiabin Wu

Games and Economic Behavior, 2023, vol. 137, issue C, 294-316

Abstract: We introduce evolutionary dynamics for two-action games where agents with diverse preferences use statistical inference to guide their behavior. We show that the dynamic converges to a Bayesian sampling equilibrium with statistical inference (SESI) and the set of Bayesian SESIs is globally asymptotically stable. We discuss the global convergence to a unique Bayesian SESI in anti-coordination games, a welfare-improving tax scheme, equilibrium selection in coordination games, an application to the diffusion of behavior on networks, and the extension to multi-action games.

Keywords: Statistical inference; Bounded rationality; Deterministic evolutionary game theory; Sampling best response; Network games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C44 C73 D80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:137:y:2023:i:c:p:294-316

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.11.008

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