Competition in persuasion: An experiment

Wenhao Wu and Bohan Ye

Games and Economic Behavior, 2023, vol. 138, issue C, 72-89

Abstract: We experimentally investigate whether competition stimulates information revelation, by comparing two Bayesian persuasion models. One model has one sender (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011), and the other has two competing senders who move sequentially (Wu, 2022). The one-sender treatment provides strong support for Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), where the sender uses a noisy signaling device and the receiver complies with his suggestions. In the two-sender treatment, we find that: (1) overall, senders reveal more information; (2) the first sender uses the fully-revealing device more frequently than the sender in the one-sender treatment; (3) the second sender exhibits a “competitive” behavior pattern; (4) the receiver uses information from both sides. However, contrary to Wu (2022), competition does not lead to full information. To rationalize the behavior, we use the Quantal Response Equilibrium model to explain the features of the empirical results.

Keywords: Bayesian persuasion; Multiple senders; Laboratory experiment; Quantal response equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:138:y:2023:i:c:p:72-89

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.12.003

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