The logit dynamic in supermodular games with a continuum of strategies: A deterministic approximation approach
Ratul Lahkar,
Sayan Mukherjee and
Souvik Roy
Games and Economic Behavior, 2023, vol. 139, issue C, 133-160
Abstract:
We consider large population supermodular games with pairwise interaction and a continuous strategy set. Our objective is to establish convergence of the logit dynamic in such games to logit equilibria. For this purpose, we apply the deterministic approximation approach, which interprets a deterministic dynamic as an approximation of a stochastic process. We first establish the closeness of this dynamic with a step–wise approximation. We then show that the logit stochastic process is close to the step–wise logit dynamic in a discrete approximation of the original game. Combining the two results, we obtain our deterministic approximation result. We then apply this result to supermodular games. Over finite but sufficiently long time horizons, the logit stochastic process converges to logit equilibria in a discrete approximation of the supermodular game. By the deterministic approximation approach, so does the logit dynamic in the continuum supermodular game.
Keywords: Supermodular games; Logit dynamic; Deterministic approximation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:139:y:2023:i:c:p:133-160
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.02.003
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