Object reallocation problems with single-dipped preferences

Yuki Tamura

Games and Economic Behavior, 2023, vol. 140, issue C, 181-196

Abstract: For object reallocation problems, TTC is the leading rule: if preferences are strict but otherwise unrestricted, it is the only rule satisfying efficiency, the endowments lower bounds, and strategy-proofness (Ma, 1994); moreover, it is the only rule satisfying the endowments lower bounds, strategy-proofness, and endowment-swapping-proofness (Fujinaka and Wakayama, 2018). We focus on the domain of single-dipped preferences, and ask whether these results hold there. We show that they do. Returning to preferences that are strict but otherwise unrestricted, TTC is not “obviously strategy-proof” (Li, 2017). Again we ask if this remains true on the domain of single-dipped preferences, and show that on this domain, TTC does satisfy this property. Moreover, the domain of single-dipped preferences is a maximal domain on which TTC is obviously strategy-proof.

Keywords: Object reallocation problems; Single-dipped preferences; TTC; Obvious strategy-proofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:140:y:2023:i:c:p:181-196

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.03.006

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