Temptation and guilt

Jawwad Noor and Linxia Ren

Games and Economic Behavior, 2023, vol. 140, issue C, 272-295

Abstract: Submitting to temptation gives rise to guilt, and the anticipation of guilt can generate guilt-avoidance. But guilt-avoidance may itself cause guilt. To account for this, we model guilt-avoidance as a temptation. The model unifies evidence pertaining to social preferences, perfectionism and information avoidance. While the social preference literature interprets moral hypocrisy as reflecting selfishness in true preferences, the model suggests that it may reflect a temptation to be selfish instead.

Keywords: Guilt; Normative preference; Temptation; Social preference; Perfectionism; Welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:140:y:2023:i:c:p:272-295

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.02.010

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