Pure-strategy equilibrium in Bayesian potential games with absolutely continuous information

Ezra Einy and Ori Haimanko ()

Games and Economic Behavior, 2023, vol. 140, issue C, 341-347

Abstract: We prove the existence of a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in Bayesian games with absolutely continuous information and a Bayesian potential that is upper semi-continuous in actions for any realization of the players' types. In particular, all Bayesian potential games with finitely many actions and absolutely continuous information possess a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium.

Keywords: Bayesian games; Bayesian potential; Pure-strategy equilibrium; Continuous payoffs; Absolute continuity of information; Purification (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Working Paper: PURE-STRATEGY EQUILIBRIUM IN BAYESIAN POTENTIAL GAMES WITH ABSOLUTELY CONTINUOUS INFORMATION (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:140:y:2023:i:c:p:341-347

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.04.004

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