Motives behind cooperation in finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma

Anujit Chakraborty

Games and Economic Behavior, 2023, vol. 141, issue C, 105-132

Abstract: This paper deploys a novel experiment to compare three behavioral theories that explain both selfish and non-selfish cooperation. The three theories fuse reputational cooperation (à la Kreps et al. (1982)) with the following three non-selfish motives respectively: caring about others (Altruism), being conscientious about cooperation (Duty), and enjoying social-efficiency (Efficiency-Seeking). We use reputational cooperation under purely Selfish preferences as a fourth theory. Our experimental design varies the decline-rate of future rewards, under which these theories predict rich patterns of behavior. Based on a Finite Mixture Model, the data is best explained if the modal subject types are Selfish and Efficiency-Seeking: We estimate that 40-49% of our subjects are Selfish, 36-45% are Efficiency-seeking, and 6-20% are Altruistic. We find little evidence for Duty players.

Keywords: Experimental economics; Finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma; Behavioral game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:141:y:2023:i:c:p:105-132

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.06.002

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