On the manipulability of equitable voting rules

Steven Kivinen

Games and Economic Behavior, 2023, vol. 141, issue C, 286-302

Abstract: We consider the equity-manipulability trade-off when voting over two alternatives. Pairwise equity is a weakening of anonymity requiring certain permutations of the voters' identities to preserve the outcome of the election. ℓ-robust group strategy-proofness (ℓ-RGSP) and fine robust group strategy-proofness (FRGSP) are notions of group strategy-proofness that allow voters to have different beliefs about players' types (Kivinen and Tumennasan, 2021). Our main results show that, under mild conditions, for pairwise equitable voting rules anonymity is equivalent to 2-RGSP, 3-RGSP, and FRGSP. In this way, anonymity is special in its equity and non-manipulability. These results follow from several preliminary results, one of which equates 2-RGSP to comonotonicity and swap-robustness. Finally, we consider the manipulability of k-unanimous rules, and 2-RGSP when agents can be indifferent and abstain.

Keywords: Robust group strategy-proofness; Majority voting; Equitable voting rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D71 D80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:141:y:2023:i:c:p:286-302

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.06.005

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