Optimal and fair prizing in sequential round-robin tournaments: Experimental evidence

Arne Lauber, Christoph March and Marco Sahm

Games and Economic Behavior, 2023, vol. 141, issue C, 30-51

Abstract: We experimentally investigate how the prize structure affects the intensity, fairness, and dynamic behavior in sequential round-robin tournaments with three players. We compare tournaments with a second prize equal to either 0%, 50%, or 100% of the first prize. While theory predicts the 50%-treatment to be most intense, we find that aggregate effort is highest in the 0%-treatment. In contrast, our evidence supports the predictions that the 50%-treatment is fairest (though not perfectly fair), whereas the late mover is advantaged in the 100%-treatment and disadvantaged in the 0%-treatment. Also in line with the theory, we identify a strategic (reverse) momentum: after winning the first match, a player increases (decreases) effort in the second match of the 0%-treatment (100%-treatment). Additional findings suggest that dynamic behavior is also subject to a psychological momentum.

Keywords: Sequential round-robin tournament; All-pay auction; Fairness; Intensity; Strategic momentum; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D72 Z20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Optimal and Fair Prizing in Sequential Round-Robin Tournaments: Experimental Evidence (2022)
Working Paper: Optimal and fair prizing in sequential round-robin tournaments: Experimental evidence (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:141:y:2023:i:c:p:30-51

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.05.011

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