Incentive compatibility in sender-receiver stopping games

Aditya Aradhye, János Flesch, Mathias Staudigl and Dries Vermeulen

Games and Economic Behavior, 2023, vol. 141, issue C, 303-320

Abstract: We introduce a model of sender-receiver stopping games, in which the sender observes the current state, and sends a message to the receiver to either stop the game, or to continue. The receiver, only seeing the message, then decides to stop the game, or to continue. The payoff to each player is a function of the state when the receiver quits, with higher states leading to better payoffs.

Keywords: Sender-receiver games; Stopping games; Bayesian games; Incentive compatibility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Working Paper: Incentive compatibility in sender-receiver stopping games (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:141:y:2023:i:c:p:303-320

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.06.008

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