Stable sharing

Antonio Nicolo', Pietro Salmaso, Arunava Sen and Sonal Yadav

Games and Economic Behavior, 2023, vol. 141, issue C, 337-363

Abstract: We propose a simple model in which agents are matched in pairs in order to complete a task of unit size. The preferences of agents are single-peaked and continuous on the amount of time they devote to it. Our model combines features of two models: assignment games (Shapley and Shubik (1971)) and the division problem (Sprumont (1991)). We provide an algorithm (Select-Allocate-Match) that generates a stable and Pareto efficient allocation. We show that stable allocations may fail to exist if either the single-peakedness or the continuity assumption fail.

Keywords: Job sharing; Matching; Stability; Pareto efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:141:y:2023:i:c:p:337-363

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.06.009

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