Prioritized organ allocation rules under compatibility constraints

Mengling Li, Yohanes Riyanto and Menghan Xu

Games and Economic Behavior, 2023, vol. 141, issue C, 403-427

Abstract: We study the efficacy of the donor-priority rule in promoting deceased organ donation under blood-type compatibility constraints in both theory and the laboratory. Compared with an allocation policy in which transplantations are performed only within the same blood-type group, we find that transferring organs across blood-type compatible groups discourages the donation incentives of hard-to-match agents and reduces the supply of the more widely acceptable type of organ. Meanwhile, the easy-to-match agents have higher incentives to donate. At the aggregate level, both our theoretical and experimental results suggest that the aggregate donation rate is lower under allocation policies that allow blood-type compatible transplants among different blood-type groups.

Keywords: Market design; Organ donation; Priority rule; Laboratory experiment; Compatibility constraint (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D47 D64 D78 I11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825623000970
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:141:y:2023:i:c:p:403-427

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.07.005

Access Statistics for this article

Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai

More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().