Unique stable matchings

Gregory Z. Gutin, Philip R. Neary and Anders Yeo

Games and Economic Behavior, 2023, vol. 141, issue C, 529-547

Abstract: In this paper we consider the issue of a unique prediction in one-to-one two-sided matching markets, as defined by Gale and Shapley (1962), and we prove the following: TheoremLet P be a one-to-one two-sided matching market and letP⁎be its associated normal form, a (weakly) smaller matching market with the same set of stable matchings that can be obtained using procedures introduced inIrving and Leather (1986)andBalinski and Ratier (1997). The following three statements are equivalent:(a)P has a unique stable matching.(b)Preferences onP⁎are acyclic, as defined byChung (2000).(c)InP⁎every market participant's preference list is a singleton.

Keywords: Unique stable matching; Normal-form; Acyclic preferences; Iterated deletion of unattractive alternatives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:141:y:2023:i:c:p:529-547

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.07.010

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