A non-cooperative interpretation of the f-just rules of bankruptcy problems

Chih Chang and Cheng-Cheng Hu

Games and Economic Behavior, 2008, vol. 63, issue 1, 133-144

Abstract: First, we propose an axiomatic characterization of the f-just rules. Second, based on the result, a game is designed and a non-cooperative interpretation of the f-just rules is provided.

Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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