Pre-auction offers in asymmetric first-price and second-price auctions

Rene Kirkegaard and Per Overgaard ()

Games and Economic Behavior, 2008, vol. 63, issue 1, 145-165

Abstract: We consider first-price and second-price auctions with asymmetric buyers, and examine whether pre-auction offers to a subset of buyers are profitable. A single offer is never profitable prior to a second-price auction, but may be profitable prior to a first-price auction. However, a sequence of offers is profitable in either type of auction. In our model, suitably chosen pre-auction offers work because they move the assignment when bidder valuations are "near the top" closer to the optimal, revenue-maximizing assignment.

Date: 2008
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899-8256(07)00164-9
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Pre-Auction Offers in Asymmetric First-Price and Second-Price Auctions (2005)
Working Paper: Pre-Auction Offers in Asymmetric First-Price and Second-Price Auctions (2005)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:63:y:2008:i:1:p:145-165

Access Statistics for this article

Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai

More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().