Existence of Nash equilibria in finite extensive form games with imperfect recall: A counterexample

Philipp Wichardt

Games and Economic Behavior, 2008, vol. 63, issue 1, 366-369

Abstract: This paper provides an example showing that for finite extensive form games without perfect recall existence of Nash equilibria in behaviour strategies is not guaranteed in general.

Date: 2008
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