Equal-need sharing of a network under connectivity constraints

Herve Moulin and Francois Laigret

Games and Economic Behavior, 2011, vol. 72, issue 1, 314-320

Abstract: We propose a simple division of the costs of non-rival resources, when a user's need can be met by different subsets of the resources, and no resource is redundant. Our method is characterized by the Stand Alone core property, additivity in costs, and a symmetry requirement.

Keywords: Cost; sharing; Network; Connectivity; Stand; alone; core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899-8256(10)00132-6
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:72:y:2011:i:1:p:314-320

Access Statistics for this article

Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai

More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().