On the elimination of dominated strategies in stochastic models of evolution with large populations

Christoph Kuzmics

Games and Economic Behavior, 2011, vol. 72, issue 2, 452-466

Abstract: A stochastic myopic best-reply dynamics is said to have property (W), for a given number of players n, if every pure weakly dominated strategy in every n-player game is eliminated in the long-run distribution of play induced by the dynamics. In this paper I give a necessary and sufficient condition that a dynamics has to satisfy in order for it to have property (W). The key determinant is found to be the sensitivity of the learning-rate to small payoff differences, inherent in the dynamics. If this sensitivity is higher than a certain cut-off, which depends on the number of players, then the dynamics satisfies property (W). If it is equal to or below that cut-off, then the dynamics does not satisfy property (W).

Keywords: Learning; Experimentation; S[infinity]W-procedure; Weak; dominance; Iterated; strict; dominance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825610001636
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: On the elimination of dominated strategies in stochastic models of evolution with large populations (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:72:y:2011:i:2:p:452-466

Access Statistics for this article

Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai

More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().