On auction protocols for decentralized scheduling

Nicholas G. Hall and Zhixin Liu

Games and Economic Behavior, 2011, vol. 72, issue 2, 583-585

Abstract: This note shows that, for the combinatorial market goods defined by Wellman et al. (2001), there may not exist an optimal allocation that is in equilibrium. Moreover, this result holds even if the value of each processed job is independent of its completion time. The proposed algorithm for finding an equilibrium allocation, using an assignment model, fails due to complementarity, even for instances that admit an optimal allocation which is in equilibrium.

Keywords: Capacity; allocation; and; scheduling; Noncooperative; game; Auction; Equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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