Incentives in core-selecting auctions with single-minded bidders

Ryuji Sano

Games and Economic Behavior, 2011, vol. 72, issue 2, 602-606

Abstract: This paper considers some package auctions with known single-minded bidders. A single-minded bidder is interested in a unique bundle of goods and bids only for that bundle. We examine each bidder's incentive in Ausubel and Milgrom's (2002) ascending proxy auction and every bidder-optimal core-selecting auction. We provide a simple condition for each bidder to report his valuation truthfully, which can be expressed in a single sentence--any "rival" of my "rivals" is my "rival." The Vickrey outcome lies in the core if and only if this condition holds for every bidder; however, it is rarely satisfied.

Keywords: Package; auction; Core-selecting; auction; Ascending; proxy; auction; Single-minded; bidder (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:72:y:2011:i:2:p:602-606

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