Voting blocs, party discipline and party formation

Jon Eguia

Games and Economic Behavior, 2011, vol. 73, issue 1, 111-135

Abstract: I study the strategic incentives to coordinate votes in an assembly. Coalitions form voting blocs, acting as single players and affecting the policy outcome. In an assembly with two exogenous parties I show how the incentives to accept party discipline depend on the types of the agents, the sizes of the parties, and the rules the blocs use to aggregate preferences. In a game of fully endogenous party formation, I find sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibria with one bloc, two blocs, and multiple blocs.

Keywords: Voting; blocs; Party; formation; Party; discipline; Coalition; formation; Voting; rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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