Coalitional bargaining games with random proposers: Theory and application

Akira Okada

Games and Economic Behavior, 2011, vol. 73, issue 1, 227-235

Abstract: We consider a non-cooperative coalitional bargaining game with random proposers in a general situation for which players differ in recognition probability and time preference. We characterize an efficient equilibrium as the generalized Nash bargaining solution that belongs to the core. The model is applied to wage bargaining between an employer and multiple workers. Although involuntary unemployment may occur in equilibrium, full employment emerges as players become sufficiently patient.

Keywords: Non-cooperative; coalitional; bargaining; Random; proposers; Nash; bargaining; solution; Wage; bargaining; Core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (34)

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Working Paper: Coalitional Bargaining Games with Random Proposers: Theory and Application (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:73:y:2011:i:1:p:227-235

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