On the folk theorem with one-dimensional payoffs and different discount factors
Thibaut Lamadon and
Caroline Thomas ()
Games and Economic Behavior, 2011, vol. 73, issue 1, 287-295
Proving the folk theorem in a game with three or more players usually requires imposing restrictions on the dimensionality of the stage-game payoffs. Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) assume full dimensionality of payoffs, while Abreu et al. (1994) assume the weaker NEU condition ("nonequivalent utilities"). In this note, we consider a class of n-player games where each player receives the same stage-game payoff, either zero or one. The stage-game payoffs therefore constitute a one-dimensional set, violating NEU. We show that if all players have different discount factors, then for discount factors sufficiently close to one, any strictly individually rational payoff profile can be obtained as the outcome of a subgame-perfect equilibrium with public correlation.
Keywords: Repeated; games; Folk; theorem; Different; discount; factors (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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