Characterization of the Shapley–Shubik power index without the efficiency axiom

Ezra Einy and Ori Haimanko ()

Games and Economic Behavior, 2011, vol. 73, issue 2, 615-621

Abstract: We show that the Shapley–Shubik power index on the domain of simple (voting) games can be uniquely characterized without the efficiency axiom. In our axiomatization, the efficiency is replaced by the following weaker requirement that we term the gain-loss axiom: any gain in power by a player implies a loss for someone else (the axiom does not specify the extent of the loss). The rest of our axioms are standard: transfer (which is the version of additivity adapted for simple games), symmetry or equal treatment, and dummy.

Keywords: Simple games; Shapley–Shubik power index; Efficiency axiom (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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Working Paper: Characterization of the Shapley-Shubik Power Index Without the Efficiency Axiom (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:73:y:2011:i:2:p:615-621

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.03.007

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