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How corporate governance affects productivity in civil-law business environments: Evidence from Latin America

Sandra Gaitán, Hernán Herrera-Echeverri and Eduardo Pablo

Global Finance Journal, 2018, vol. 37, issue C, 173-185

Abstract: We examine the relationship between corporate governance and productivity in nonfinancial publicly traded firms based in Latin America. Using a sample of 670 firm-year observations from 2006 to 2014, we find that board size, gender diversity, institutional ownership, and the presence of independent directors affect firms' productivity. We find a statistically significant nonlinear relationship between board size and productivity. Institutional ownership increases productivity, while board independence decreases it. However, when the country's business friendliness and institutional ownership are controlled, the relationship between board independence and productivity turns positive and statistically significant. Finally, a higher proportion of female directors decreases productivity.

Keywords: Productivity; Governance; Emerging markets; Country environment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G32 G34 G38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:glofin:v:37:y:2018:i:c:p:173-185

DOI: 10.1016/j.gfj.2018.05.004

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