Structural remedies as a signaling device

Markus Dertwinkel-Kalt () and Christian Wey

Information Economics and Policy, 2016, vol. 35, issue C, 1-6

Abstract: We analyze the effects of structural remedies on merger activity when the Antitrust Agency (AA) cannot observe a proposed merger’s efficiency type. Provided the AA follows a consumer surplus standard, an efficient merger type is doomed to over-fix with its divestiture proposal in a pooling equilibrium, which is also possible under separation.

Keywords: Remedies; Divestiture; Merger control; Signaling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 L13 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Structural remedies as a signalling device (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:iepoli:v:35:y:2016:i:c:p:1-6

DOI: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2016.03.002

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