Competition for attention in the digital age: The case of single releases in the recorded music industry

Christian Essling, Johannes Koenen () and Christian Peukert ()

Information Economics and Policy, 2017, vol. 40, issue C, 26-40

Abstract: In markets with long tails and thousands of products, like recorded music, consumers cannot possibly be aware of every product. We analyze how record labels use single releases as a strategic instrument to attract consumer attention in a competitive environment. In particular, we study how the advent of digitization has changed firm strategy. In accordance with predictions from a simple theoretical model, we show that record labels release more singles with shorter intervals in between when facing greater competitive pressure. We show that this effect is stronger in the digital age. With individual songs becoming readily available (forced unbundling), the attention generation motive becomes predominant and single releases more closely resemble a form of advertising.

Keywords: Consumer attention; Information; Digitization; Recorded music (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 L82 M37 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167624516300555
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Competition for attention in the digital age: The case of single releases in the recorded music industry (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:iepoli:v:40:y:2017:i:c:p:26-40

DOI: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2017.05.002

Access Statistics for this article

Information Economics and Policy is currently edited by D. Waterman

More articles in Information Economics and Policy from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().