Open access to research data: Strategic delay and the ambiguous welfare effects of mandatory data disclosure
Frank Mueller-Langer and
Patrick Andreoli-Versbach
Information Economics and Policy, 2018, vol. 42, issue C, 20-34
Abstract:
Mandatory disclosure of research data is an essential feature for credible empirical work but comes at a cost: First, authors might invest less in data generation if they are not the full residual claimants of their data after the first journal publication. Second, authors might “strategically delay” the time of submission of papers in order to fully exploit their data in subsequent research. We analyze a three-stage model of publication and data disclosure. We find that the welfare effects of universal mandatory data disclosure are ambiguous. The mere implementation of mandatory data disclosure policies may be welfare-reducing, unless accompanied by appropriate incentives which deter strategic delay.
Keywords: Data disclosure policy; Strategic delay; Welfare effects (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B40 C80 L59 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)
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Related works:
Working Paper: Open access to research data: Strategic delay and the ambiguous welfare effects of mandatory data disclosure (2018)
Working Paper: Open Access to Research Data: Strategic Delay and the Ambiguous Welfare Effects of Mandatory Data Disclosure (2014) 
Working Paper: Open Access to Research Data: Strategic Delay and the Ambiguous Welfare Effects of Mandatory Data Disclosure (2014) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:iepoli:v:42:y:2018:i:c:p:20-34
DOI: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2017.05.004
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