Open access to research data: Strategic delay and the ambiguous welfare effects of mandatory data disclosure
Frank Müller-Langer and
Patrick Andreoli-Versbach
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Mueller-Langer
Munich Reprints in Economics from University of Munich, Department of Economics
Abstract:
Mandatory disclosure of research data is an essential feature for credible empirical work but comes at a cost: First, authors might invest less in data generation if they are not the full residual claimants of their data after the first journal publication. Second, authors might "strategically delay" the time of submission of papers in order to fully exploit their data in subsequent research. We analyze a three-stage model of publication and data disclosure. We find that the welfare effects of universal mandatory data disclosure are ambiguous. The mere implementation of mandatory data disclosure policies may be welfare-reducing, unless accompanied by appropriate incentives which deter strategic delay.
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)
Published in Information Economics and Policy 42(2018): pp. 20-34
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Related works:
Journal Article: Open access to research data: Strategic delay and the ambiguous welfare effects of mandatory data disclosure (2018) 
Working Paper: Open Access to Research Data: Strategic Delay and the Ambiguous Welfare Effects of Mandatory Data Disclosure (2014) 
Working Paper: Open Access to Research Data: Strategic Delay and the Ambiguous Welfare Effects of Mandatory Data Disclosure (2014) 
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