Market performance and collusion in sequential and simultaneous multi-object auctions: Evidence from an ascending auctions experiment

Katerina Sherstyuk and Jeremy Dulatre

International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2008, vol. 26, issue 2, 557-572

Abstract: We compare efficiency and susceptibility to collusion of two alternative ways to sell multiple objects in independent private values environments: simultaneous and sequential ascending auctions. Both auctions are common in the real world. With explicit communication among bidders, collusion was more frequent in sequential than in simultaneous auctions. We further analyze collusive schemes adopted by bidders.

Date: 2008
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:indorg:v:26:y:2008:i:2:p:557-572

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