The unilateral incentives for technology transfers: Predation (and deterrence) by proxy

Anthony Creane and Hideo Konishi

International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2009, vol. 27, issue 3, 379-389

Abstract: Joint production between rival firms often entails knowledge transfers without direct compensation, leaving the question as to why more efficient firms would give their rivals such an advantage. We find that such transfers are credible mechanisms to make the market more competitive so as to deter entry or force exit. We determine that with free entry such transfers are profitable and further it may be optimal to predate or deter every firm possible so that a market with many firms can become a duopoly. While consumers are harmed by such action, production efficiency normally increases sufficiently so that welfare increases.

Keywords: Entry; deterrence; Predation; Technology; transfers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:indorg:v:27:y:2009:i:3:p:379-389

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