Vertical merger, collusion, and disruptive buyers

Volker Nocke and Lucy White

International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2010, vol. 28, issue 4, 350-354

Abstract: In a repeated game setting of a vertically related industry, we study the collusive effects of vertical mergers. We show that any vertical merger facilitates upstream collusion, no matter how large (in terms of capacity or size of product portfolio) the integrated downstream buyer. But a vertical merger with a larger buyer helps more to facilitate upstream collusion than a similar merger with a smaller buyer. This formalizes the idea expressed in the U.S. and EU Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines that some downstream buyers may be more "disruptive" of collusive schemes than others.

Keywords: Vertical; merger; Collusion; Disruptive; buyer; Merger; guidelines; Repeated; game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Working Paper: Vertical Merger, Collusion, and Disruptive Buyers (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:indorg:v:28:y:2010:i:4:p:350-354

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