Leniency and post-cartel market conduct: Preliminary evidence from parcel tanker shipping

John Asker

International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2010, vol. 28, issue 4, 407-414

Abstract: This paper provides preliminary observations from data involving a cartel in the international maritime shipping of chemicals. These data provides a setting in which to consider how the presence of a cartel affects market conduct following its dissolution and, in turn, how this might be affected by the obligations imposed on firms who seek leniency. The patterns in the data are consistent with cartel distortions persisting in the post-cartel period, possibly due to the presence of long-term contracts. An implication is that, in addition to terminating involvement in cartel activity, some social benefit may accrue from requiring firms seeking leniency to mitigate the harm caused by cartel actions.

Keywords: Shipping; Bid; rigging; Ring; Cartel; Damages (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:indorg:v:28:y:2010:i:4:p:407-414

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