Can real-effort investments inhibit the convergence of experimental markets?

Timothy Cason, Lata Gangadharan () and Nikos Nikiforakis ()

International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2011, vol. 29, issue 1, 97-103

Abstract: Evidence shows that real-effort investments can affect bilateral bargaining outcomes. This paper investigates whether similar investments can inhibit equilibrium convergence of experimental markets. In one treatment, sellers' relative effort affects the allocation of production costs, but a random productivity shock ensures that the allocation is not necessarily equitable. In another treatment, sellers' effort increases the buyers' valuation of a good. We find that effort investments have a short-lived impact on trading behavior when sellers' effort benefits buyers, but no effect when effort determines cost allocation. Efficiency rates are high and do not differ across treatments.

Keywords: Property; rights; Real; effort; Posted-offer; markets; Random; shock; Surplus; creation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Can Real-Effort Investments Inhibit the Convergence of Experimental Markets? (2010)
Working Paper: Can Real?Effort Investments Inhibit the Convergence of Experimental Markets? (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:indorg:v:29:y:2011:i:1:p:97-103

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