Abuse of dominance and licensing of intellectual property

Patrick Rey and David Salant

International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2012, vol. 30, issue 6, 518-527

Abstract: We examine the impact of the licensing policies of one or more upstream owners of essential intellectual property (IP hereafter) on the variety offered by a downstream industry, as well as on consumers and social welfare. When an upstream IP monopoly increases the number of licenses, it enhances product variety, adding to consumer value, but it also intensifies downstream competition, and thus dissipates profits. As a result, the upstream IP monopoly may want to provide too many or too few licenses relative to what maximizes consumer surplus or social welfare.

Keywords: Intellectual property; Licensing policy; Vertical integration; Patent pools (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L4 L5 O3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (27)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Abuse of Dominance and Licensing of Intellectual Property (2012)
Working Paper: Abuse of Dominance and Licensing of Intellectual Property (2012)
Working Paper: Abuse of Dominance and Licensing of Intellectual Property (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:indorg:v:30:y:2012:i:6:p:518-527

DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2012.05.003

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