Global cartels, leniency programs and international antitrust cooperation

Jay Choi and Heiko Gerlach

International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2012, vol. 30, issue 6, 528-540

Abstract: In this paper we analyze cartel formation and self-reporting incentives when firms operate in several geographical markets and face antitrust enforcement in different jurisdictions. We are concerned with the effectiveness of leniency programs and the benefits of international antitrust cooperation between agencies. When international antitrust prosecution is uncoordinated, multi-market contact allows firms to reduce the amount of self-reporting in equilibrium and sustain cartels more effectively. We then discuss the effects of information sharing among antitrust authorities as a function of how much and which type of information is exchanged. We show that extensive information sharing might have an adverse effect on self-reporting by cartel members.

Keywords: Cartel formation; Multi-market contact; Leniency programs; International antitrust cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016771871200063X
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Global Cartels, Leniency Programs and International Antitrust Cooperation (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:indorg:v:30:y:2012:i:6:p:528-540

DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2012.05.005

Access Statistics for this article

International Journal of Industrial Organization is currently edited by P. Bajari, B. Caillaud and N. Gandal

More articles in International Journal of Industrial Organization from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().