Austrian-style gasoline price regulation: How it may backfire
Martin Obradovits ()
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2014, vol. 32, issue C, 33-45
Abstract:
In January 2011, a price regulation was established in the Austrian gasoline market which prohibits firms from raising their prices more than once per day. Similar restrictions have been discussed in New York State and Germany. Despite their intuitive appeal, this article argues that Austrian-type policies may actually harm consumers. In a two-period duopoly model with consumer search, I show that under the regulation, firms will distort their prices intertemporally in such a way that their aggregate expected profit remains unchanged. This implies that, as some consumers find it optimal to delay their purchase due to expected price savings, but find it inconvenient to do so, a friction is introduced that decreases net consumer surplus in the market.
Keywords: Price regulation; Consumer search; Retail gasoline; Price dispersion; Intertemporal search; Austria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 L13 L5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167718713000994
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
Related works:
Working Paper: Austrian-style gasoline price regulation: How it may backfire (2012) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:indorg:v:32:y:2014:i:c:p:33-45
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2013.10.009
Access Statistics for this article
International Journal of Industrial Organization is currently edited by P. Bajari, B. Caillaud and N. Gandal
More articles in International Journal of Industrial Organization from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().