International harmonization of the patent-issuing rules

Kaz Miyagiwa and Yuka Ohno

International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2015, vol. 39, issue C, 81-89

Abstract: Using a dynamic model of patent races for two sequential innovations, Scotchmer & Green (1990) compared the effect on R&D incentives of the two patent-issuing rules, first-to-invent and first-to-file, and found first-to-file more conducive to R&D. We show that their result depends on their assumption of fixed innovation probabilities. When innovation probabilities are endogenous for the intermediate invention, their result can be reversed. Our analysis has the obvious implications on the evaluation of the Leahy–Smith America Invents Act (2011), whereby the U.S. switched from first-to-invent to first-to-file.

Keywords: R&D competition; Patent laws and legislation; Intellectual property rights; Patent priority rules; Sequential innovation; Management of technological innovation and R&D (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F1 O3 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: International Harmonization of the Patent-Issuing Rules (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:indorg:v:39:y:2015:i:c:p:81-89

DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.02.004

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