Innovation in a generalized timing game

Vladimir Smirnov and Andrew Wait ()

International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2015, vol. 42, issue C, 23-33

Abstract: We examine innovation as a market-entry timing game with complete information and observable actions. We characterize all pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibria for the two-player symmetric model allowing both the leader’s and the follower’s payoff functions to be multi-peaked, non-monotonic and discontinuous. We provide sufficient conditions for when the equilibria can be Pareto-ranked and when the equilibrium is unique. Economic applications discussed include process and product innovation and the timing of the sale of an asset.

Keywords: Timing games; Entry; Leader; Follower; Process innovation; Product innovation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 L13 O31 O33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:indorg:v:42:y:2015:i:c:p:23-33

DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.06.003

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