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Corruption in PPPs, incentives and contract incompleteness

Elisabetta Iossa and David Martimort

International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2016, vol. 44, issue C, 85-100

Abstract: We analyze risk allocation and contractual choices when public procurement is plagued with moral hazard, private information on exogenous shocks, and threat of corruption. Complete contracts entail state-contingent clauses that compensate the contractor for shocks unrelated to his own effort. By improving insurance, those contracts reduce the agency cost of moral hazard. When the contractor has private information on revenues shocks, verifying messages on shocks realizations is costly. Incomplete contracts do not specify state-contingent clauses, thereby saving on verifiability costs. This makes incomplete contracts attractive even though they entail greater agency costs. Because of private information on contracting costs, a public official may have discretion to choose whether to procure under a complete or an incomplete contract. When the public official is corrupt, such delegation results in incomplete contracts being chosen too often. Empirical predictions on the use of incomplete contracts and policy implications on the benefits of standardized contracts are discussed.

Keywords: Corruption; Incomplete contracts; Moral hazard; Principal–agent–supervisor model; Public–private partnerships; Risk allocation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 D82 K42 L33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (26)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Corruption in PPPs, incentives and contract incompleteness (2016)
Working Paper: Corruption in PPPs, incentives and contract incompleteness (2016)
Working Paper: Corruption in PPPs, Incentives and Contract Incompleteness (2015) Downloads
Working Paper: Corruption in PPPs, Incentives and Contract Incompleteness (2014) Downloads
Working Paper: Corruption in PPPs, Incentives and Contract Incompleteness (2014) Downloads
Working Paper: Corruption in PPPs, Incentives and Contract Incompleteness (2014) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:indorg:v:44:y:2016:i:c:p:85-100

DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.10.007

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