When do switching costs make markets more or less competitive?
Francisco Ruiz-Aliseda
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2016, vol. 47, issue C, 121-151
Abstract:
In a two-period duopoly setting in which switching costs are the only reason why products may be perceived as differentiated, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for switching costs to lead to higher prices in the first period as well as to higher overall profitability. We show that this happens if and only if switching costs are not too large. We present the only treatment up to date of how switching costs (and only switching costs) affect competition based on the assumption that switching costs differ across consumers, which allows us to illustrate the undesired byproduct of assuming that products exhibit substantial horizontal differentiation. Not only do we draw implications for the classical literature on competition with switching costs, but also for the more recent one that rests upon such an assumption too.
Keywords: Switching cost heterogeneity; Market share accumulation; Consumer foresight; Lock-in (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 M21 M31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167718716300200
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:indorg:v:47:y:2016:i:c:p:121-151
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2016.04.002
Access Statistics for this article
International Journal of Industrial Organization is currently edited by P. Bajari, B. Caillaud and N. Gandal
More articles in International Journal of Industrial Organization from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().