Licensing a technology standard

Chun-Hui Miao

International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2016, vol. 47, issue C, 33-61

Abstract: I examine the optimal licensing strategy of the owner of a proprietary technology standard in a monopolistically competitive industry. The standard owner can be either an outsider inventor or a joint venture of downstream firms. I find that (1) a simple revenue royalty replicates the integrated monopoly outcome; (2) a patent pool cannot do better than adopting a non-discriminatory licensing policy that offers higher royalty rates to pool members than to nonmembers; (3) if the standard owner also sells a complementary good, then it may choose a decentralized marketplace as a commitment not to maximize licensing revenue. Implications to the use of RAND pricing in standard settings are discussed.

Keywords: Licensing; Monopolistic competition; Patent pool; Royalty; Technology standard; Vertical control (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D4 G2 L1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167718716300017
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:indorg:v:47:y:2016:i:c:p:33-61

DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2016.02.001

Access Statistics for this article

International Journal of Industrial Organization is currently edited by P. Bajari, B. Caillaud and N. Gandal

More articles in International Journal of Industrial Organization from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().