Frontiers in spectrum auction design
Martin Bichler and
Jacob Goeree ()
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2017, vol. 50, issue C, 372-391
Spectrum auction design has seen number innovations in the recent years. Regulators have used various types of combinatorial auction formats including simple ascending combinatorial clock auctions and first-price sealed-bid combinatorial auctions. The Simultaneous Multi-Round Auction (SMRA) and the two-stage Combinatorial Clock Auction (CCA) are the most wide-spread auction formats for spectrum sales to date. We provide an accessible overview of strategic problems in these auction formats and summarize research challenges in this field for a broader audience of readers in industrial organization.
Keywords: Auction theory; Market design; Spectrum auction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:indorg:v:50:y:2017:i:c:p:372-391
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