Optimal licensing of technology in the face of (asymmetric) competition
Byoung Heon Jun and
Elmar Wolfstetter ()
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2018, vol. 60, issue C, 32-53
We reconsider the optimal technology licensing by an incumbent firm facing multiple competitors. First, we cover the case of one license and show that competition has a drastic effect on optimal two-part tariffs. We also consider license auctions and design a more profitable dynamic mechanism. Next, we allow the licensor to award multiple licenses and design a dynamic mechanism that extracts the maximum industry profit. It awards licenses to all firms, prescribes maximum permitted royalty rates and positive fixed fees, and is more profitable than other dynamic mechanisms. Finally we show that a slight modification of that mechanism is also optimal for outside patent holders.
Keywords: Patent licensing; Dynamic mechanisms; Menu auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D43 D44 D45 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Optimal Licensing of Technology in the Face of (Asymmetric) Competition (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:indorg:v:60:y:2018:i:c:p:32-53
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